

Illinois Institute for Regulatory Policy Studies

Future Jobs, Future Costs, and Future Usage: Reconciling Higher Costs And Lower Usage

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Effects of FEJA Widespread

- ▶ Three major subjects addressed in the bill:
 - 1) Zero Emission Credits (ZECs)
 - 2) Energy Efficiency
 - 3) Renewable Energy/Solar Rebates

- ▶ Benefits, opportunities, costs and impacts vary considerably:
 - ▶ On industrial, commercial, and residential consumer
 - ▶ On utilities, generators, competitors, developers
 - ▶ On jobs

- ▶ Impacts are additive to Smart Grid investment

Zero Emission Credits

▶ ZEC volume

- Consumer cost tracks consumer consumption: larger consumers of energy, larger cost
 - 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)

▶ ZEC price cap

- 1.65% of 2008-09 kilowatthour price
 - 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(3)

▶ ComEd draft tariff: 0.195¢/kwh all customers

- ComEd, ICC No.10, Orig. Sheet No.37, eff. June 1, 2017

▶ Price per kwh may vary among utilities:

- Ameren 0.172¢/kwh
- Mid American 0.124¢/kwh

Bill Impact – Residential Consumers

- ▶ Residential ZEC cost range:
 - Large electric space heat customers - \$46.00/yr (75 percentile)
 - Small Multi-family non-space heat cust. - \$4.50/yr (25 percentile)
- ▶ Comparison to Smart Grid Law Investments increases from 2016 to 2017*
 - Large electric space heat customers - \$47.47/yr
 - Multi-family non-space heat customers - \$4.61/yr
- ▶ Cumulative distribution bill increases for ComEd since 2012
 - Large space heat customers - \$264.52 (32%)
 - Multi-family non-space heat customers - \$50.81 (23%)

*Source: ComEd Smart Grid Advanced Metering Annual Implementation Progress Report, April 2017 & April 2013

ZECs and Jobs

- ▶ Total revenue, or financial benefit to owner of nuclear plants: \$230 million per year, subject to adjustment based on future energy prices and capacity prices.
 - 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(3).
- ▶ Nuclear Jobs: 700 and 750 plant jobs at Clinton and Quad Cities preserved, plus seasonal employees.
- ▶ Consumers effectively pay Exelon a little more than \$150,000 per plant job per year.

Energy Efficiency

- ▶ Substantial increase in spending on EE expected by ComEd. In 2017, EE expense = \$261 million (utilities, DCEO, IPA)

Year	ComEd Rate Base	Total
2018-2021	\$353 million/year	\$1.412 billion
2022-2025	\$378 million/year	\$1.512 billion*
2026-2030	\$403 million/year	\$1.612 billion*

*Per spending cap found in: 220 ILCS 5/8-103B(m)

- ▶ Voltage Optimization: \$500 million
- ▶ Total spending through 2030: \$5.036 billion
- ▶ Smart Grid authorized investment (220 ILCS 5/16-108.5(b))
 - ComEd - \$2.6 billion/10 yrs
 - Ameren - \$0.625 billion/10 yrs
- ▶ ComEd total rate base for 2016: \$8.8 billion
 - Rate base additions: \$1.487 million
 - 2018 EE spending increases rate base additions by 23%

Effect of Amortization on Energy Efficiency Incentives and Practices


- ▶ Shift from pass-through to amortized cost recovery, lower initial bills, higher bills in the long run.
 - EE becomes a profit center as shareholders receive a return on EE spending. 220 ILCS 5/8-103B.

- ▶ EE spending represents an increase of ~20%-30% in annual Smart Grid rate base investment driving up consumer rates over time
 - EE incentive structure can increase ROE 200 basis points (for example, from 8.34% to 10.34%) 220 ILCS 5/8-103B(g)(7)/
 - Low-income EE costs more for less savings and effect may be to discourage spending on low-income customers.
 - In 2018-2021, less than 10% of total EE spending for low-income customers proposed (25% of residential spending), but 47% of residential customers qualify as low-income. 220 ILCS 5/8-103(f)(4).

- ▶ Substantial shift in spending and recovery from residential to commercial and industrial classes expected.
 - Residential programs: 35% (cost to resid. 45% with Misc)
 - Commercial and industrial programs: 42% (cost to C&I 55% with Misc)
 - Miscellaneous (VO, R&D, market transformation, administration): 23%

EE spending will steadily increase rates


ComEd's Energy Efficiency Revenue Requirement Effect
Before >10 MW removed




Renewable Energy - Rate Effect

- ▶ RPS cost cap not changed. 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(c)(2)
- ▶ Solar rebates added to rate base will create a new rate base item. 220 ILCS 5/16-107.6.
- ▶ Increased renewable energy may put downward pressure on supply prices.
- ▶ Increased distributed generation will reduce usage levels.
 - Illinois DG at low levels: <1,000 rooftop solar
 - Usage levels held steady or declined despite little DG
 - Increased DG can be expected to be another cause of decreased usage

Delivery Charges and Usage



CHARGES: ZECs, EE and solar rebates together will increase ComEd revenue requirement by more than 25% from current \$2.7 billion over the next 10 years.



USAGE: EE and DG provisions of FEJA expected to drive down usage



Key questions: will *increased charges* due to greater EE spending and amortization, ZECs, and other infrastructure be offset by *decreased costs* due to reduced usage?

Growing Utility Revenue Requirement; Declining Usage

- ▶ Delivery utilities still monopolies providing an essential service.
- ▶ If supply charges stay low or decline further, larger portion of energy bills will be for expensive monopoly services. Supply savings may not offset increased delivery charges.
- ▶ As use of the grid declines, fewer customers pay for increasingly expensive monopoly services, increasing per unit cost.
- ▶ **Key challenge is to rein in spending to correspond with anticipated declining usage.**

Conclusion

- ▶ FEJA will drive up rate base and customer costs.
- ▶ FEJA will drive down usage.
- ▶ Ultimate effect of FEJA will vary by individual customers:
 - Customers who reduce usage will have lower total supply charges, but savings may be diminished by low supply prices.
 - All customers will see higher per unit delivery charges, which cannot be avoided.
- ▶ Declining usage should be addressed by identifying practices that reduce delivery services costs to track reduced usage.
- ▶ The “next grid” must recognize declining usage and reject extraordinary regulatory attempts:
 - To protect or expand utility revenues,
 - To expand utility investments beyond the essential delivery function,
 - To expand non-by-passable or fixed charges, or adopt unfair and unpredictable rate design.